Unfriendly to Liberty

There are modern-day tropes about New Yorkers being cut from a different cloth, or even living under the impression their city is better than others on the East Coast, if not better than any other in the country. Two hundred and fifty years ago, in 1776, John Adams was, according to his diary, wondering what was in the water in Manhattan to make New Yorkers act the way they did. But in this case, it wasn’t an air of entitlement. As author Christopher F. Minty writes, Adams “wondered if there was ‘any Thing in the Air, or Soil’ that was ‘unfriendly to the Spirit of Liberty.’”

In his book, Unfriendly to Liberty: Loyalist Networks and the Coming of the American Revolution in New York City, Minty explains how New York City became the Loyalist hub Adams came to observe in 1776, at a time when enthusiasm for independence caught fire throughout the rest of the newly declared nation. Minty focuses on the DeLancey faction and the party’s election to the New York Assembly in 1768, as well as how they gathered support for their opposition to the economic upheaval that a revolution would, and did, bring. The book shows how allegiances in the lead-up to and early days of the Revolutionary War were neither inevitable nor automatic, and were influenced by a variety of factors, including local politics and culture, as was the case in Manhattan. Read an excerpt below from Unfriendly to Liberty about the experiences of New Yorkers 250 years ago, during the late summer and fall of 1776.

EXCERPT

The Howes galvanized support. James Grant, British general and the former governor of East Florida, boasted that “if a good bleeding can bring those Bible-faced Yankees to their senses—the fever of Independence should soon abate.” On August 22, 1776, when British forces secured control of Long Island, and on September 15, when they secured New York City, the ensuing emergence of loyalism over the following years confirmed Grant’s observations. Basil Feilding, sixth Earl of Denbigh, noted, “The Inhabitants receive our People with the utmost Joy, having been long oppress’d for their Attachement to Government.”

As British forces reasserted control, the Howes invited delegates from the Continental Congress to negotiate a peace settlement. The Staten Island Peace Conference, as it was known, was attended by Richard Howe and John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Edward Rutledge. A so-called Messenger of Peace, Howe informed Franklin that he wanted to “effect a lasting peace and reunion between the two countries” and end the war, and he told the delegates that he would not negotiate with them “as a Committee of Congress” but as “private Gentlemen of Influence.” But as Howe quickly learned, his attempts would not be successful. The delegates’ objectives varied widely from his. The men from Philadelphia refused to consider anything short of American independence. Howe’s instructions from George III were inadequate, containing nothing of importance other than “granting pardons.” The Americans’ unexpected reluctance shifted the Howes’ plans. They moved toward mobilizing New York’s loyalists.

Times were changing in Manhattan. The revolutionary government that had so closely monitored people’s behavior was gone. So, too, were their printing presses. John Holt fled twice to avoid British capture, first to Kingston and then to Poughkeepsie. Both places were hardly ideal locations, and his business suffered. But not everybody followed Holt’s nomadic path. Many stayed, and their reactions to the Howes’ proclamations offer a useful paradigm from which to appreciate the contingent nature of allegiance in a society riven by distress and war. As British forces replaced American in New York, the Howes were aware of the volatile environment they entered. They recognized that local military events could have an important impact upon colonists’ allegiance and subsequent behavior. In the royal proclamations, the Howes offered New York revolutionaries amnesty, indicating that they could return to their former post without suffering any retribution. But their proclamations were widely criticized, especially by ardent loyalists and British officials. Ambrose Serle, William Howe’s secretary, bemoaned that “Rebels in Prison… claimed the Benefit of the Proclamation,” while “Some of the old Friends to the Gov. are much displeased at its Publication.” Serle was an avid critic of the Howes’ leniency. He believed that revolutionaries’ loyalism was disingenuous. “The People here,” Serle argued, “of any and of all Professions, are not to be trusted to themselves, that their Attachement is precarious at best to our Gov.” Serle declared that the proclamations “violently offends all those who have suffered for their Attachement to Government.”