A Most Gallant Resistance

Philadelphia has always been a port city, and the Delaware River is its gateway to the world. During the American Revolutionary War, the Revolutionaries knew that if the British attempted to take the new American capital, they would have to do so by controlling the Delaware. As would be seen when General Howe’s army marched into Philadelphia in September 1777, controlling the city did not mean controlling the river, and without that, any occupying army would be without supplies or communication with the larger world.   

In his book A Most Gallant Resistance: The Delaware River Campaign September – November 1777, James McIntyre illustrates an often-forgotten part of the Philadelphia Campaign. After the Battle of Brandywine and the British capture of Philadelphia, the many river defenses built by the Revolutionaries held firm, denying Howe the supplies he needed to feed and clothe his army in the rebel capital. The British army needed to deal with each individual fort and battery, all while being harassed by the Pennsylvania State Navy, the Commonwealth’s maritime militia. Fort Mercer, Fort Mifflin, Hog Island, Carpenters Island and Billingsport were just some of the sites fought over to determine who would control the vital waterway. This book brings readers into the defenses on the river through the viewpoints of soldiers and sailors on both sides who experienced this part of the Revolutionary War. 

Excerpt

For the British, the opening of the river meant being able to retain control of the city of brotherly love. As an interim measure, they resorted to bringing ships up the river to Chester, Pennsylvania, where they were unloaded, and their contents transported overland to Philadelphia. Such a method of supplying the city was both difficult and precarious. The long land line of communications from Chester to Philadelphia, which included movement over a number of poorly maintained country roads, made an easy and appealing target for American raids. As a result, the British were forced to provide substantial escorts to the supplies transported overland, in turn reducing their ability to mount subsequent offensive actions against Washington's beleaguered Continentals or maintain a solid defense of Philadelphia. While a small quantity of supplies was able to get through, and these provided some addition to the commissary stores in Philadelphia, the flow came nowhere near meeting the needs of the British Army and the civilians in the city. The trickle needed to grow to a flood, or the American capital would become un-tenable. Therefore, it was necessary to break the American hold on the river or the ability of the city to serve as winter quarters for the British Army would be seriously compromised. It is clear William Howe was quite aware of the necessity of opening the Delaware to British shipping. Among his aides, John André, later famed for his role in Benedict Arnold's treason, left this diary entry for October 3, 1777, "Our communication with the ships was only by land." Opening the Delaware River to British shipping would require close coordination between the British land and naval forces, something the British had developed quite thoroughly by time of the American War.

McIntyre, James. A Most Gallant Resistance: The Delaware River Campaign September – November 1777 (Point Pleasant, NJ: Winged Hussar Publishing, 2022) pp. 119-120.